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EXPLAINING THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING UNITED
STATES V. SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC.
ROBERT H. FUHRMAN AND PATRICK D. TRAYLOR*
Since the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
levied a $12.6 million fine against Smithfield Foods, Inc. in August 1997, l
Smithfield has been held up as a poster child for strong federal
environmental enforcement. The $12.6 million penalty-the largest in
Clean Water Act history-has been cited with vigorous approval by
environmentalists and government officials in support of the view that
courts and federal agencies are becoming increasingly intolerant of state-
sponsored "sweetheart deals" with corporate polluters, and that these
corporations will eventually face a day of economic reckoning.- These
commenters energetically contend that the federal government rightfully
forced Smithfield to disgorge the benefit of its bargain with state
regulatory authorities in order to restore a level playing field among
regulated entities
Lost in the tumult concerning "sweetheart deals" and "leveling the
playing field" is a single, inescapable fact: Smithfield gained no economic
benefit from its compliance with state orders. Indeed, Smithfield will
Robert H. Fuhrman is a Principal in the Washington, D.C. office of The Brattle Group,
an economic, environmental, and management consulting firm. Patrick D. Traylor is an
associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P. Mr. Fuhrman
served as an expert witness in U.S. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., and Mr. Traylor served as
counsel for the defendants in that case. The authors gratefully acknowledge certain ideas
that they have used with permission that were contained in briefs prepared by lawyers at
Hogan & Hartson L.L.P. and Mays & Valentine, L.L.P. and in the amicus curiae brief of
the American Automobile Manufacturers Association, et al., in support of Smithfield
Foods, which was prepared by Scott M. DuBoff, Esq., of Wright & Talisman, P.C.
I See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 354 (E.D. Va. 1997).
Oral argument on the appeal was held in U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Richmond, Virginia on October 26, 1998.
2 See, e.g., Lee R. Okster, Smithfield Foods: A Case for Federal Action, 23 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 381 (1999); Derek A. Yeo & Roy A. Hoagland, United
States v. Smithfield: A Paradigmatic Example of Lax Enforcement of the Clean Water
Act by the Commonwealth of Virginia, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 513
(1999).
3 See generally Okster, supra note 2.
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spend considerably more money to comply with the Commonwealth of
Virginia's orders than it would have spent to comply under the method of
compliance preferred by the federal government.4 This incontrovertible
fact renders moot much of the rhetoric surrounding the case. Without the
spectre of a corporation intentionally fattening its bottom line at the
expense of the environment, the case is reduced to a relatively routine set
of enforcement issues.
The premise of this Article is that the government's testimony and
the court's decision constitute indisputable deviations from established
principles of calculating economic benefit. The result of a correct
application of sound economic principles is that Smithfield obtained no
economic benefit through noncompliance.
This Article first outlines the facts that led to the filing of the
federal enforcement action. Next, it outlines the primary legal issues
raised by Smithfield both at the trial and appellate levels. Finally, the
Article articulates the proper economic principles that should be used in
cases like Smithfield, provides a first-hand illustration of how the federal
government and the court deviated from them, and explains how even in
deviating from accepted principles, the government grossly overstated
Smithfield's economic benefit of noncompliance.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1975, the Commonwealth of Virginia assumed primary
authority to administer the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Act,
the Clean Water Act, or CWA) within Virginia.5 A central feature of
Virginia's administration of the Act is its ability to issue Virginia Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (VPDES) permits to point sources of water
pollution.6 In accordance with the 1975 Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) executed between Virginia and EPA Region III (Region III),
Region III retains an important oversight role in Virginia's permit issuance
4 See discussion infia notes 104 through 170 and accompanying text.
5 See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Permit and Enforcement Programs
between the State Water Control Board and the Regional Administrator, Region III,
Environmental Protection Agency (1975) [hereinafter MOU] (on file with author).
6 See id. pt. III para. 1.
480 [Vol. 23:479
EXPLAINING THE CONTROVERSY
process.7 Region III's oversight role includes the authority to review and
comment on draft VPDES permits.8
Smithfield owns and operates two hog-slaughtering facilities in
Smithfield, Virginia.9 Both the Smithfield Packing Company and the
Gwaltney of Smithfield facilities discharged process wastewater
containing phosphorus to the Pagan River in accordance with the terms of
their pre-1992 VPDES permits." The Pagan River is a tributary of the
James River," which itself discharges into the lower Chesapeake Bay at
Norfolk, Virginia.
A. Smithfield's Challenge to Virginia's Policy for Nutrient Enriched
Waters
Because of concerns that the Chesapeake Bay was beginning to
exhibit signs of eutrophication from excess nutrient loading, Virginia
promulgated its Policy for Nutrient Enriched Waters (Policy) in 1988.12
The Policy targeted certain point sources discharging phosphorus into the
Chesapeake Bay watershed, and established for these sources a
concentration-based effluent limit for phosphorus of 2 milligrams per liter
(mg/1). 3 Importantly, EPA did not, and does not today, have a nationwide
limit on the discharge of phosphorus into nutrient-enriched waters. The
Policy was wholly a state initiative promulgated as a state regulatory
requirement.
Shortly after promulgation of the 2 mg/l limit, Smithfield filed suit
challenging the application of the Policy to its facilities on the Pagan
River. 4 Specifically, Smithfield contended that Virginia had calculated
the phosphorus limit based on the ability of large-volume municipal
7 See generally id. pt. III. The Commonwealth of Virginia administers its Clean Water
Act program in accordance with the inherent power of the state to protect the public
health and welfare. EPA's role in the Commonwealth is therefore not as a primary
enforcement authority, but as a federal overseer of the Commonwealth's implementation
of national Clean Water Act standards.
8 See id. pt. III paras. 5-8.
9 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 772-73 (E.D. Va. 1997).
1o See id. at 774.
" See id. at 773.
12 See Va. Admin. Code tit. 9, §§ 25-40-30 to -50, 25-440-130.
13 See id. § 25-40-30.
14 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 774.
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wastewater treatment plants to achieve the phosphorus concentration of
2 mg/i. 5 Large-volume municipal wastewater facilities typically receive
influent containing only 6 mg/l of phosphorus, and are well-suited to
reduce that concentration to the 2 mg/l level. In contrast, Smithfield's
facilities generated wastewater containing as much as 60 mg/l of
phosphorus. 6 To achieve the same 2 mg/i concentration, Smithfield's
treatment plant would have had to achieve a 97 percent reduction in
phosphorus concentrations.
Smithfield argued that the 2 mg/l concentration limit was not
reasonable and practicable of attainment. 7 Indeed, Smithfield found no
other animal slaughterhouses of its size in the United States that were
subject to such a stringent limit on phosphorus discharges. 8  To
Smithfield, the state had inadvertently included an industrial discharger in
a Policy designed for municipal wastewater treatment plants. 9
Notwithstanding Smithfield's state court challenge, the Virginia
Department of Environmental Quality's Tidewater Regional Office, in
accordance with the Policy, modified Smithfield's VPDES permit on
January 4, 1990, to include the 2 mg/l phosphorus limit.2" In response,
Smithfield appealed the permit modification.2' Faced with the prospect of
having the Policy declared inapplicable throughout the state because of
Smithfield's dual appeals, Virginia agreed to reconsider whether the
2 mg/1 limit had been inappropriately applied to Smithfield.22
B. Virginia's Settlement of Smithfield's Challenge to the Policy
In an administrative Special Order dated March 21, 1990, Virginia
15 See Petition for Appeal, 30 Smithfield Foods Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
Chancery No. 3912 (Va. Cir. Ct. Isle of Wight Co. June 3, 1988) (on file with author).
16 See VPDES Permit No. 0059005, Application for Renewal at 9 (Dec. 18, 1990) (on
file with author).
17 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 774.
18 See WELLS ENGINEERS ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., STUDY AND REPORT: PHOSPHORUS
REMOVAL: SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC., SMITHFIELD, VIRGINIA 12 (1990).
19 See Petition for Appeal, supra note 15, 30-34.
20 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 774.
21 See id.
22 See id. at 774-75.
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agreed to suspend commencement of the phosphorus removal facility
construction schedule in Smithfield's 1990 permit for a short period
during which time Smithfield would finance a study to determine the
feasibility of complying with the 2 mg/1 phosphorus limit.23 In addition,
Virginia requested and Smithfield agreed to explore an alternative
compliance scenario, the elimination of phosphorus discharges to the
Pagan River by connecting to the Hampton Roads Sanitation District
(HRSD) municipal wastewater treatment plant as an industrial
discharger.- Smithfield was required to report back to Virginia by
November 13, 1990, on the results of the study and the possibility of
connecting to HRSD.25  Virginia later deferred Smithfield's decision
deadline for three months to February 15, 1991.26
Smithfield's challenge to the Policy was finally resolved on May 9,
1991, when Virginia issued a final administrative Special Order to
Smithfield.27 In the 1991 Special Order, Virginia noted that Smithfield
had completed the required phosphorus removal feasibility study.28
Smithfield had determined, as it had argued to Virginia in its original
challenges, that compliance by Smithfield with the 2 mg/1 standard was
not consistently achievable, and therefore not reasonable and practicable
of attainment.29 Virginia also noted in the 1991 Special Order that HRSD
needed more time to evaluate the suitability of Smithfield's effluent.3"
Therefore, the 1991 Special Order required Smithfield to advise Virginia
no later than June 15, 1991, of Smithfield's "commitment to connect to
HRSD or to upgrade their facilities to comply with the 2 milligram per
liter phosphorus standard." 3'
The Special Order stated that if Smithfield decided to connect to
23 See id.
24 See id. at 775.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See Commonwealth of Virginia, State Water Control Board, Special Order Issued to
Smithfield Foods, Inc., May 9, 1991, at 2 (on file with author) [hereinafter May 9, 1991
Special Order].
29 See Trial Tr. at 777-78, United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.
Va. 1997) (on file with author).30 See May 9, 1991 Special Order, supra note 28, at 2.
31 Id.
1999] 483
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
HRSD, it was obliged to complete the connection within ninety days after
HRSD notified Smithfield that the connection was available.32 Conversely,
if Smithfield decided not to connect to HRSD, Smithfield would be
required to submit a construction schedule for completing the onsite
facilities necessary to enable it to comply with the 2 mg/1 standard as a
direct discharger.33  In exchange for these compliance alternatives,
Smithfield agreed to dismiss its pending judicial challenge to the Policy.34
On June 7, 1991, Smithfield formally notified Virginia that it had
elected to comply with the 2 mg/1 phosphorus limit by connecting to
HRSD.35 After eighteen months of negotiations, Virginia had secured a
binding commitment from Smithfield to completely eliminate its discharge
of wastewater to the Pagan River, while at the same time protecting the
applicability of the Policy to sources of excess nutrients.36
C. Smithfield's 1992 VPDES Permit
In 1991, Smithfield's VPDES permit was due for renewal.37 In
July of that year, Virginia permit writers carried over the 2 mg/l
phosphorus limit from Smithfield's 1990 permit.38 Under the terms of the
1975 MOU, a pre-release version of Smithfield's draft permit was
transmitted to EPA Region III." Region III approved the terms in the pre-
release draft permit and reminded Virginia that any significant public
comments or modifications of the draft permit in response to public
comments should also be transmitted to Region II.40
When Smithfield was presented with a copy of the draft permit in
September, the pre-settlement 2 mg/l phosphorus limit was still in the
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 775.
35 See id.
36 See generally id.
37 See Commonwealth of Virginia, State Water Control Board, Authorization to
Discharge Under the Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, Permit, No. VA
0059005 (May 13, 1986) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1986 VPDES Permit].
38 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 776.
39 See MOU supra note 5, pt. III para. 6.
40 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 776.
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permit.4' On October 1, Smithfield filed a formal written comment on the
draft permit with Virginia. In its comment, Smithfield stated:
Compliance dates of the effluent characteristics and
engineering milestones listed in the Part I, section C tables
(pages 6 and 7) cannot be met by Smithfield Foods, Inc.
now that we have agreed to abandon the plans to upgrade
our existing facilities and tap onto HRSD when it becomes
available. Relief from such compliance is not specifically
present or is not apparent in the [1991] Consent Order. In
view of these factors, Smithfield Foods, Inc. requests that if
these compliance dates and milestones are required in the
proposed permit, some documentation or letter be provided
by the State Water Control Board stating that alternate
compliance will be maintained with Smithfield's agreement
to connect to HRSD as soon as it becomes available
regardless of the time frame in which this occurs.42
In this statement, Smithfield clearly noted its concern that the
terms of the draft permit did not match the agreement reached with
Virginia only five months earlier.
Virginia responded to Smithfield's comment on October 10, by
stating:
The compliance schedules and related goal dates contained
in the permit are there to afford the permittee necessary
time to comply with the established effluent limitations.
Any special order agreements relative to compliance with
water quality standards, the Permit regulation and
associated studies that have been approved by the Board
take precedence over the VPDES Permit.41
Virginia's October response indicated that a copy had been sent.to
EPA Region III in accordance with the 1975 MOU.44 On January 3, 1992,
41 See id.
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 Id. (emphasis added).
44 See id.
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Virginia issued the final VPDES permit, including the 2 mg/l phosphorus
limit.4 Region III had almost three months in which to comment on
Virginia's response exempting Smithfield from compliance with the
2 mg/1 standard, but said nothing to either Virginia or Smithfield.
The above statements notwithstanding, the trial court was not
persuaded that the May 9, 1991, Special Order took precedence over
permit requirements. The court reasoned that the terms of the 1991
Special Order did not take precedence over the 1990 Permit because the
1991 Special Order specifically provided in a footnote that the Special
Order did not modify the terms of the 1990 Permit.46 Moreover, the court
reasoned that because Smithfield's 1992 Permit also included the 2 mg/i
limit, it was illogical to conclude that the 1991 Special Order took
precedence over a later-issued permit.4 7 Last, the court reasoned that
because Smithfield had not applied for a formal permit modification
embodying the terms of the 1991 Special Order, Smithfield could not now
be heard to complain of the application to it of the strict terms of the 1990
Permit.48
D. Smithfield's Connection to HRSD
Smithfield and HRSD began working together in late 1991 to
facilitate the connection.4 9 Three tasks had to be completed. First, HRSD
had to complete the expansion of its Nansemond, Virginia wastewater
treatment plant before it would be able to treat Smithfield's wastes."
Second, HRSD had to construct a 17-mile pipeline from Nansemond,
Virginia, to Smithfield, Virginia, to carry Smithfield Foods' wastes.5 An
additional benefit of this pipeline was that the entire Smithfield, Virginia
area would be served by the Nansemond facility and end decades of water
quality problems associated with rural septic systems and the Town of
45 See id.
46 See id. at 786.
47 See id. at 788.
48 See id. at 787-88.
49 See Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 787.
s0 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 778.
s' See id.
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Smithfield's outdated sewage treatment plant.5 2 Notably, Smithfield
Foods provided $300,000 to construct a pumping station to facilitate the
connection of the Town of Smithfield to HRSD 3 Last, Smithfield Foods
had to construct on-site wastewater pretreatment works before it could
discharge its effluent to HRSD. 4
Smithfield's commitment to connect permanently to the HRSD
system, and Smithfield's irrevocable commitment to pay HRSD in excess
of $2 million per year in user charges were key factors in securing the
financing of the $54.4 million dollar expansion of HRSD's Nansemond
facility and construction of the $14.6 million pipeline.5" HRSD obtained
these construction funds from the EPA-administered State Revolving Loan
Fund. 6 Without such financial assurances, HRSD would not have been
able to support the bond issuance necessary to repay the Revolving Loan
Fund.5 7 In its review of the HRSD-Smithfield project, EPA Region III
noted that the loan "offers a cost effective solution for this major regional
industry."5
8
In addition to agreeing to connect to HRSD, Smithfield committed
to construct an onsite pretreatment facility to service its two plants, which
ultimately cost $2.8 million.5 ' These pretreatment facilities were by their
nature insufficient to enable Smithfield to comply as a direct discharger
with the 2 mg/1 phosphorus limitation and were constructed only to
- facilitate Smithfield's connection to HRSD. Indeed, in order for HRSD's
biological treatment facilities to work efficiently, Smithfield could not
reduce the pollutants in its effluent to extremely low levels.60 HRSD
would be responsible for complying with the ultimate 2 mg/l phosphorus
limit.
52 See United States v. Smithfield Foods Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 353 (E.D. Va. 1997).
53 See Brief for Appellants at 12, Smithfield Foods Inc. v. United States (No. 97-2709)
[hereinafter Brief for Appellants].
54 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 778.
ss See id.
56 See id.
57 See Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 787-88, 790-91.
58 Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 784-85.
59 See ROBERT H. FUHRMAN, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS PROVIDED ON BEHALF OF
SMITHFIELD FOODS INC., IN U.S. V. SMITHFIELD FOODS INC. ET AL. tbl. 3 (June 20, 1997)
(on file with author).
6 0 See Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 783, 797.
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Because of HRSD's delays in obtaining funding and unforeseeable
construction delays by HRSD's contractors,6' the 17-mile pipeline was not
available until March 1996.62 The Nansemond upgrade was not complete
at that time, so in August of 1996, Smithfield was only able to connect the
Gwaltney plant to the HRSD system. 3
In June 1997, the Nansemond upgrade was complete and
Smithfield connected its remaining facilities to the HRSD system on
August 6, 1997, thereby completely eliminating its discharge of
phosphorus and other effluents to the Pagan River.64 Compared to
complying as a direct discharger (which would have allowed Smithfield to
continue to discharge 2 mg/I of phosphorus into the Pagan River), this zero
discharge result was the product of HRSD, Smithfield, and Virginia, all
cooperating to ensure that the basin-wide nutrient reduction goals of
Virginia were achieved, while providing HRSD with a steady stream of
income with which to finance and operate its major facility upgrade, and
providing Smithfield with a guaranteed means to comply with its
obligations under the CWA.
At no time during the five year period between 1991 and 1996 did
EPA Region III suggest in any way that Smithfield's connection to the
HRSD system was anything other than a "win-win" situation between the
industry and federal and state environmental regulators.
E. The United States 'Enforcement Action Against Smithfield
On December 16, 1996, more than five years after EPA had
sufficient information to understand that Virginia had decided to allow
Smithfield not to comply with the 2 mg/1 limit for phosphorus pending its
61 For example, HRSD experienced certain difficulties with its contractors and its entire
construction headquarters burned down during construction. See id. at 795-96.
62 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 778. Importantly, Smithfield had little or no control
over HRSD's construction schedule. Though Smithfield cooperated with HRSD in
providing effluent samples and worked with the Town of Smithfield to arrange for a
pumping station to connect the Town to HRSD. HRSD was the governmental authority
responsible for constructing the required facilities.
63 See id.
64 See Scott Harper, Meat Packer Hooks Into Sewage Lines, VA. PILOT, Aug. 8, 1997, at
B1.
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connection to HRSD, the United States filed a complaint against
Smithfield in federal district court in the Eastern District of Virginia,
Norfolk Division.6" The allegations in the complaint suggested almost
7,000 violations of Smithfield's VPDES permit." Over seventy-three
percent of these violations were attributed to discharges of phosphorus
under the terms of Virginia's Special Orders.67
Barely three months later, before discovery had concluded, the
United States moved for partial summary judgment on liability.68
Smithfield responded with three main arguments. First, Smithfield argued
that the 1991 Special Order superseded inconsistent provisions in the 1992
permit.69 Second, Smithfield argued that the United States' action was
barred by section 309(g)(6) of the Clean Water Act, which provides that
when a state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an enforcement
action under state law comparable to section 309, the federal government
is precluded from bringing a parallel enforcement action.7' Last,
Smithfield argued that section 510 of the Act precluded the United States
from interfering with Virginia's right to enforce its state phosphorus
standard, which was more stringent than necessary to satisfy nationwide
pollution guidelines and requirements.7'
On May 30, 1997, the trial court granted the United States' motion
for partial summary judgment on liability for at least 164 days of
nonreporting and for nearly six thousand violations of effluent limitations
for phosphorous, ammonia-nitrogen, total Kjeldahl nitrogen, fecal
coliform, minimum pH, cyanide, oil and grease, carbonaceous biochemical
oxygen demand (CBOD), BOD, and total suspended solids.72 Seventy-
three percent of the cited violations were attributable to phosphorus, a
65 See Snitlfield, 965 F. Supp. at 779. Shortly before the United States filed its action,
the Commonwealth of Virginia filed an enforcement action against Smithfield alleging
violations of its fecal coliform, TKN, nitrogen, and chlorine limits, as well as a number
of recordkeeping and monitoring violations. See id.
66 See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 343.
67 See id.
68 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 780.
69 See id. at 784.
70 See id. at 79 1.
71 See id. at 795.
72 See id. at 796.
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substance not regulated by federally-promulgated effluent limitations.73
The court concluded that Smithfield was liable because the 1991 Special
Order and October 1991 correspondence did not exempt Smithfield from
compliance with the 2 mg/l limit.74 Moreover, the court held that the 1991
Special Order was not relevant to a federal enforcement suit because EPA
had not consented to be bound by the state orders, and Smithfield had not
requested that its 1992 permit be formally modified.75 The court also held
that section 309(g)(6) did not bar the United States' suit because
Virginia's water pollution control statute was not comparable to the CWA,
in that Virginia could only assess administrative penalties on consent, and
the public had no right to comment on administrative penalty orders.76
Last, the court rejected out of hand Smithfield's section 510 argument.77
II. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES
In its brief on appeal, Smithfield argued that the district court made
three distinct errors in granting summary judgment. First, Smithfield
argued that court erred in not holding that the 1991 Special Order took
precedence over inconsistent terms in the 1992 Permit.78 Specifically,
Smithfield argued that because the 2 mg/l standard was entirely a creature
of state law, and that Virginia had applied the Policy for Nutrient Enriched
Waters (i.e., the 2 mg/l limit on phosphorus) to Smithfield in a way that
excused Smithfield from complying with the Policy until it connected to
HRSD, the inconsistent terms of the 1992 Permit were superseded by the
73 Another 14% of the violations attributed to Smithfield arose from scattered and
infrequent violations of Smithfield's fecal coliform. total Kjeldahl nitrogen, total
suspended solids, cyanide, and chlorine limits. The remaining 13% of the violations
arose from a single unauthorized act of records destruction by a Smithfield employee. If
the violations associated with destruction of records are excluded from the count, the
percentage of effluent violations attributable to phosphorus rises to 86%, a significant
portion of the United States' case. See Smithifield, 972 F. Supp. at 343.
74 See Sinithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 784-85.
75 See id. at 787-88.
76 See id. at 795.
77 See id. at 795-96.
78 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 53, at 21.
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1991 Special Order. 9 Importantly, Smithfield argued that issuance of the
1991 Special Order was not an exercise of enforcement discretion, but was
more akin to a regulatory variance with respect to Smithfield and the
Policy.8" Smithfield argued that because Virginia had bound itself through
the 1991 Special Order not to apply the 2 mg/l limit to Smithfield,
Virginia had no authority to incorporate the 2 mg/l limit in Smithfield's
1992 Permit, and the United States therefore had no authority to enforce
an unlawful permit term."
Moreover, Smithfield argued that EPA was fully aware of Virginia
and Smithfield's understanding that the 1991 Special Order took
precedence over inconsistent terms in the 1992 Permit.12 Virginia had
provided EPA Region III, in accordance with the MOU between the state
and EPA, with copies of all Special Orders directed to Smithfield, all
permits, and the October 1991 correspondence in which Virginia stated the
1991 Special Order took precedence over the 1992 Permit.83
The United States could not, and did not at trial, argue that it was
unaware of Virginia's settlement with Smithfield of the challenge to its
Policy on Nutrient Enriched Waters. Instead, the United States argued that
the plain terms of the 1992 Permit established Smithfield's obligations,
regardless of the settlement with Virginia. 4 More specifically, the United
States argued that if Smithfield disagreed with the presence of the 2 mg/l
limit, Smithfield could have and should have pursued a formal permit
modification.85 The United States argued that because Smithfield did not
pursue such a modification, the plain terms of the permit were applicable,
and the 1991 Special Order had no relevance to a federal enforcement
action.86 Additionally, the United States took issue with the argument that
either the 1991 Special Order or the October 1991 letter from Virginia to
79 See id.
80 See generally id.
81 See generally id.
82 See id. at 9-11, 20-23.
83 See generally United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 776 (E.D. Va.
1997).
84 See Brief for Appellee at 22, Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United States (No. 97-2709)
(4th Cir. Apr. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
85 See id.
86 See id. at 23.
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Smithfield could have modified the requirements of the 1992 Permit. 7
Last, the United States argued that while it could be bound by its silence
on draft permits under the MOU, the October 1991 letter was not a draft
permit, and the United States had no duty to comment on the letter, and
could not therefore be bound by statements in the letter.88
Second, Smithfield argued that the court erred in rejecting the
argument that section 510 of the Act precludes the United States from
interfering with Virginia's enforcement of its own more stringent state
effluent standard. 9 Section 510 states: "Except as expressly provided in
this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of
any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or
enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of
pollutants."9 Smithfield argued that because the 2 mg/l limit was a more
stringent state standard, Virginia had the right to adopt and enforce the
standard without interference from the federal government.9'
In support of the general principles of section 510, Smithfield cited
the Supreme Court's opinion in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.92 There, the Court stated:
Suppose ...that the Administrator agreed not to
assess or otherwise seek civil penalties on the condition that
the violator take some extreme corrective action, such as to
install particularly effective but expensive machinery, that
it otherwise would not be obliged to take. If citizens could
file suit, months or years later, in order to seek the civil
penalties that the Administrator chose to forgo, then the
Administrator's discretion to enforce the Act in the public
interest would be curtailed considerably. The same might
be said of the discretion of state enforcement authorities.93
87 See id. at 19-21.
88 See id. at 20-21.
89 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 53, at 22-23.
90 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994) (emphasis added).
91 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 53, at 37.
92 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
93 Id. at 60-61.
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Although the Gwaltney Court was dealing with a question of
citizen suit standing, in the present case Smithfield argued that the United
States' belated enforcement action was precisely the sort of parallel
proceeding restricted by the Gwaltney Court.94 Specifically, Virginia
agreed that Smithfield would take "extreme corrective action" that the
company "otherwise would not be obliged to take" in order to act in "the
public interest" by defusing Smithfield's challenge to the statewide
Policy.9" In so doing, Virginia secured the protection of nutrient enriched
waters across the state, and insured that Smithfield would reduce its
phosphorus discharges to the Pagan River to zero. Smithfield argued that
the requirements of section 510 and the complementary logic of Gwaltney
should preclude the United States from upsetting the balance of the
agreement in an enforcement action brought five years after the fact.96
The United States briefly responded by stating that its decision to
bring an enforcement action did not bind Virginia or require the state to
bring its own enforcement action, and that Virginia remains free not to
enforce the 2 mg/I limit; therefore, section 510 was not transgressed.97 As
Smithfield explained in its brief, the United States' argument misses the
point: the fact that the United States brought an enforcement action
destroyed the balance created by Virginia in agreeing not to apply the
Policy to Smithfield in exchange for the hookup to HRSD. Stated
differently, the United States' belated enforcement action is tantamount to
undoing Virginia's work, and therefore interferes with Virginia's rights
under section 510.
Last, Smithfield argued that Virginia's enforcement scheme was in
fact comparable to the Clean Water Act.98 Citing Arkansas Wildlife
Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc.," and North and South Rivers Watershed
94 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 53, at 36-37.
95 Id. at 35-37 (citing Givaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61).
96 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 53, at 38.
97 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 84, at 25.
98 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 53, at 22-23.
99 29 F.3d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1994) (comparability established where "overall regulatory
scheme affords significant citizen participation, even if the state law does not contain
precisely the same public notice and comment provisions as those found in the
[FWPCA]").
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Association v. Town of Scituate,' Smithfield argued that comparability
under section 309(g)(6) does not require that state law administrative
enforcement provisions be mirror images of their federal counterparts, but
instead should be adequate to enforce the provisions of state law.'0'
The United States responded by arguing that the inability of
Virginia to assess an administrative penalty without the consent of the
permittee, and the lack of public participation rights in the assessment of
administrative penalties rendered the Virginia statutory scheme
incomparable to the federal scheme. 2
These three issues, among others, are contentious and have been
submitted to the Fourth Circuit for resolution.'0 3 Appeals briefs submitted
to the court on behalf of the defendants and amici curiae also raise issues
dealing with the proper calculation of the economic benefit, if any, in this
case. These issues are discussed in the next section.
III. DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC ISSUES
A. Economic Benefit of Noncompliance
The Clean Water Act authorizes EPA and the courts to require
violators of environmental laws to pay civil penalties that reflect, among
other things, the amount of money the violators saved through
noncompliance. section 309(d) of the Act states:
In determining the amount of a civil penalty, the court shall
consider the seriousness of the violation or violations, the
economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any
history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply
10o 949 F.2d 552, 556 n.7 (1st Cir. 1991) (comparability established "[s]o long as the
provisions in the State Act adequately safeguard the substantive interests of citizens in
enforcement actions").
'o' See Brief for Appellants, supra note 53, at 38-42.
i02 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 84, at 33-35. Before the United States commenced
its enforcement action, the Commonwealth had addressed these alleged deficiencies
through statutory and regulatory amendments. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1182, 10.1-
1186(5) & (10) (Michie 1998).
103 See generally Brief for Appellants, supra note 53; Brief for Appellee, supra note 84.
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with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of
the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice
may require.' 4
Although the statute does not prescribe how economic benefit
should be calculated, economic benefit traditionally has been defined as
the difference between the amount of money a violator should have spent
to come into compliance on time, and the amount it actually spent to
comply at a later time. °5
104 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1994) (emphasis added).
105 "To determine a company's economic benefit from noncompliance with its permit,
one must compare the company's cash flows associated with the delayed permit
compliance measures to what those cash flows would have been if the company had
obtained the necessary pollution control equipment on time." Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 481 (D.S.C. 1995).
In contradiction to the manner in which Mr. Robert L. Harris, the government's
economic expert in Smithfield, actually performed his analysis, he wrote in his May 19,
1997, expert report:
In order to estimate the economic benefit that Smithfield Foods, Inc.
through its subsidiaries, has gained by noncompliance with its NPDES
permit under the Clean Water Act, two scenarios are compared:
(1) The Ontime Compliance scenarios represent the
approaches that Smithfield Foods, Inc., through its
subsidiaries, could have taken in order to be in
compliance with its NPDES permit at all times.
(2) The Delayed compliance scenarios depict
Smithfield Foods. Inc. subsidiaries' actual
investments or actions that brought facility into
compliance.
ROBERT L. HARRIS, EXPERT REPORT FOR UNITED STATES V. SMITHFIELD FOODS INC. 2
(May 19, 1997) (emphasis added) (on file with author) [hereinafter HARRIS REPORT].
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND THE
BEN COMPUTER MODEL (Jan. 1999) contains the following passage at 1-7 that clearly
recognizes (1) that the "on-time" and "delay" scenarios may contrast different means of
compliance and (2) that the "delay" scenario should recognize the firm's actual
expenditures:
* Compliance scenarios can sometime be complex and require many
customized calculations:
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As outlined in Part II above, Smithfield argued and still believes
that its phosphorus discharges did not violate the Act.'0 6 However, for
analytical purposes, at trial Smithfield presented testimony regarding how
economic benefit should be calculated.
The trial court ruled that Smithfield was required to be in
compliance with the 2 mg/l phosphorus standard in 1993, but failed to
achieve compliance for all pollutant limitations until 1997, when its
hookup of the Smithfield Packing facility to HRSD was complete. 0 7 The
court ruled that this delay in compliance created an economic benefit of
$4.2 million in favor of Smithfield. 8 From the court's written decision in
ON-TIME SCENARIO
I/1/92 I/I/93 1/1/94 I/1/95II 1 I
I I I I
File $250 Hire $3,000 Pay $1 M to S250k for
permit consultant equipment system upgrade
vendor to meet new regulations
DELAY SCENARIO
1/1/92 11/93 11/94 11/95 111196 11/97 11/98I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
File $100
extension
request
$100k extra Hire
revenue from $5,000
noncompliance consultant
Pay $300k
in pollution
charges
Pay $1.3m to
equipment
vendor
0 Here the violator should have started taking action for compliance
in 1992, but did not start taking any actions (and hence incurring any
costs) until a year later, in 1993.
* But because of the violator's delay, required actions for delay
scenario are very different (perhaps because of new regulations) than
for on-time scenario (as opposed to differing merely by inflation).
* Therefore, such scenarios are probably not amenable to a BEN
analysis. More customized calculations are necessary.
Id. at 1-7.
106 See supra notes 78 through 103 and accompanying text.
107 See United States v. Smithfield Foods Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 348-51 (E.D. Va. 1997).
108 See id. at 349. In his May 19, 1997 expert report, Mr. Harris calculated that
Smithfield's economic benefit was $10,350,145. See HARRIS REPORT, supra note 105, at
4. Mr. Harris' June 16, 1997 supplemental report calculated an economic benefit of
$11,118,000. See ROBERT L. HARRIS, SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORT FOR UNITED
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the penalty phase of the litigation, it is apparent that the court was
disturbed both by the number of reported values it considered violations
and by certain other issues related to environmental management at the
two Smithfield Packing and Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. plants in
Smithfield, Virginia, both of which are wholly-owned by Smithfield
Foods, Inc."' These other issues include: falsification and destruction of
records by the plants' environmental manager, who, as a result of these
actions, was convicted of criminal wrongdoing;" Smithfield's apparent
failure at times to act on consultants' recommendations; and what the
court characterized as the "[d]efendants' insufficient and inadequate
efforts at compliance.""' The court reached its penalty figure based on
three relevant factors.
First, the court concluded that the more than $2 million Smithfield
will spend each year for HRSD to treat its waste is irrelevant to the
economic analysis." 3 Nonetheless, this figure is substantially more than
Smithfield would have had to pay on an annual basis to comply as a direct
discharger." 4 The court's ruling also explicitly assumed that economic
benefit calculations should be truncated at the moment of compliance, and
that amounts spent to remain in compliance are not relevant to the
STATES V. SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC. 3 (June 16, 1997) (on file with author). In the
undated rebuttal report produced in July 1997, in response to criticisms raised by
Smithfield's engineering and economic expert witnesses, Mr. Harris revised several key
assumptions concerning compliance costs and calculated the total economic benefit
Smithfield derived from "delayed and avoided" costs to be $4,253,070. See ROBERT L.
HARRIS, EXPERT REBUTTAL REPORT FOR UNITED STATES V. SMITHFIELD FOODS INC. 5
(undated) (on file with author). Additionally, at that time he concluded that Smithfield
also obtained $16,675,249 in "wrongful profits" by producing pork products at levels in
excess of those at which it could comply with applicable environmental laws in the
absence of further investments in pollution control. See id. at 3. Although the court
allowed Mr. Harris to testify at trial on his "wrongful profits" calculation, this aspect of
his testimony was not accepted into evidence "because this opinion had not been
properly given to defendants during pre-trial discovery." Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 353
n.26.
109 See id. at 340-42.
11o See id. at 350-52.
II Seeid. at 351.
112 Id.
113 See id. at 348 n.16.
114 See ROBERT H. FUHRMAN, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS PROVIDED ON BEHALF OF
SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC. IN U.S. V. SMITHFIELD FOODS INC. ET AL. tbl.2 (June 20, 1997)
(on file with author).
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calculation of economic benefit."'
Second, the court concluded that the plaintiffs economic benefit
expert was more credible with respect to the mechanics of calculating
economic benefit, specifically the proper discount and interest-forward
rates to be used in calculating the present value of Smithfield's economic
benefit." 6 In reaching this result, the court heard testimony from DOJ's
expert, Mr. Robert L. Harris, a certified public accountant from
Birmingham, Alabama, regarding the proper discount and interest-forward
rates." 7 Against Mr. Harris' expert opinion, the court weighed the
credibility of two other experts: Dr. A. Lawrence Kolbe, a Ph.D. in
economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, co-author of a
book entitled The Cost of Capital," 8 and author of more than two dozen
academic papers discussing discount," 9 interest rate, and related issues;
and Mr. Robert H. Fuhrman, a Harvard MBA and former EPA
economist."'
Third, the court concluded that certain errors identified by the
plaintiffs in Mr. Harris' economic calculations would reduce the economic
benefit only by four percent, which the court deemed "not significant."''
Given the absence in the court's decision of an explicit relationship
between the various statutory penalty considerations listed in section
309(d) and the $12.6 million judgment assessed by the court against
Smithfield, there is at least the appearance of trebling of the economic
benefit to derive the final penalty figure. An error of $160,000 (four
percent of $4.2 million) would, of course, seem quite significant to the
I is See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 349 n. 16; Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 4'12.
116 See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 349 n.17.
17 See Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 366-367; HARRIS REPORT, supra note 105, at 5.
118 A. LAWRENCE KOLBE ET AL., THE COST OF CAPITAL: ESTIMATING THE RATE OF
RETURN FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES (M.I.T. Press 1984).
119 Discounting is a technique used in financial analysis to adjust a stream of monetary
payments or costs for the time value of money and the risk of the cash flows at issue.
The correct discount rate for the calculation of the present value of a set of expected cash
flows is the "opportunity cost of capital," which is frequently referred to as the "cost of
capital." See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE, 117-18, ch. 9 (1996).
120 See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 349 n.17.
121 Id. at 349 n.19.
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defendant even without trebling to $480,000.
The following sections discuss each of these conclusions.
B. Decision Not to Consider HRSD-Related Expenses
As outlined in the June 9, 1991, Special Order, Smithfield had two
mutually exclusive compliance alternatives available to it in 1991.122
Smithfield could have chosen to comply with the 2 mg/l phosphorus limit
by constructing an extensive on-site treatment facility.' 23 If Smithfield had
chosen this option, the relevant facility would have had to have been
constructed by January 4, 1993.124 This option would have required
Smithfield to pay capital and operating and maintenance costs associated
with the direct discharge facility for the life of Smithfield's process
operations.
Alternatively, Smithfield could have chosen to comply with the 2
mg/l limit by constructing a limited pretreatment facility through which its
effluent would be partially treated and discharged to HRSD once HRSD
was prepared to accept the effluent. This option would have required
Smithfield to pay capital and operating and maintenance costs associated
with the pretreatment facility, in addition to sewer use charges assessed by
HRSD for the life of Smithfield's process operations.
Smithfield's economic benefit testimony asserted that a correct
economic benefit analysis would compare: (1) the present value of all past
and future costs associated with "on-time" compliance as a direct
discharger beginning in 1993, against (2) the present value of all past and
future costs associated with "delayed" compliance as an indirect
discharger beginning in 1997.125 The inclusion of all past and future costs
of compliance in the economic benefit analysis was referred to in court
and is referred to below as a "life-cycle" analysis.1 21
According to Mr. Fuhrman's unrebutted trial testimony,
consideration of all life-cycle costs, including post-compliance operations
and maintenance costs, is the standard method used in Clean Water Act
122 See United States v. Smithfield Foods Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 775 (E.D. Va. 1997).
123 See id. at 774.
124 See id. at 777.
125 See FUHRMAN, supra note 114, at 2-3; Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 640-41, 656-57.
126 See Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 640, 642.
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enforcement litigation as well as settlements. 27  He testified, without
rebuttal, that the consideration of past and future life-cycle costs was
accepted in "every single case that has gone to court" where the economic
benefit of delayed and avoided compliance costs had been at issue.'28 In
all of these cases the economic benefit analysis was based on the
difference between: (1) the present value life-cycle stream of costs
underlying the hypothetical on-time case; and (2) the present value life-
cycle stream of costs the violator actually incurs.12  In other words, the
comparison drawn by these cases has been between hypothetical on-time
case compliance costs and real-world delay-case compliance costs.
Moreover, EPA computer software (the BEN model) and the BEN
User's Manual expressly prescribe the use of life-cycle cost analyses,
including an endless sequence of replacement cycles at the end of the
useful life of pollution control equipment. 30 Although BEN is primarily
used in settlement, nothing in the BEN User's Manual or any other
publicly-available EPA document indicates that EPA uses dramatically
different methodologies in settlement than its testifying economic experts
use at trial. Additionally, an expert witness on economic benefit issues
who has been a frequent witness for the United States has testified that the
method he uses in litigation to determine economic benefit on behalf of
the United States "is virtually identical" to the BEN model. 3'
127 See id. at 640.
128 Id. at 640 11.20-24, 644 11.6-10.
129 See id. at 639-40.
130 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, BEN USER'S MANUAL A-7, A-29,
A-31 item B (Dec. 1993). According to page 1-2 of the manual:
In general, the BEN computer model is used for calculating economic
benefit for purposes of developing a settlement penalty. The BEN
model is generally not intended for use at trial or in an administrative
hearing. If the Agency is going to present economic benefit testimony
at trial or in an administrative hearing, the Agency will generally rely
on an expert to provide an independent financial analysis of the
economic benefit the firm has obtained as a result of its violations.
This independent financial analysis, while consistent with the
principles of the BEN model, may not necessarily be identical to that
set forth in the BEN Users Manual.
Id. at 1-2.
131 See Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc.,
40 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1917 (D.N.J. 1995) (testimony of Dr. Michael Kavanaugh).
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As shown at trial, and not seriously challenged by the government
or its economic expert, if all the past and future costs paid by Smithfield to
comply by connecting to HRSD are considered in a traditional life-cycle
analysis, and compared to the costs of on-time compliance as a direct
discharger, it would have been far cheaper for Smithfield to upgrade its
own on-site treatment facilities and to continue discharging to the Pagan
River.'32 Based on the financial method propounded by Dr. Kolbe,'33 Mr.
Fuhrman calculated that the present value of the cost of compliance as an
indirect discharger actually exceeded by at least $14 million'34 the present
value of the cost of compliance as a direct discharger. 3 That is to say,
132 See Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 656-57.
133 Support for this method may also be found in Stewart C. Myers, Kenneth T. Wise,
and M. Alexis Maniatis' monograph THE BEN MODEL AND THE CALCULATION OF
ECONOMIC BENEFIT, prepared for twelve national trade associations and submitted to
U.S. EPA in March 1997. See generally STEWART C. MYERS ET AL., THE BRATTLE
GROUP, THE BEN MODEL AND THE CALCULATION OF ECONOMIC BENEFIT (Mar. 1997)
(on file with author). Dr. Myers is Gordon Y Billard Professor of Finance at M.I.T.'s
Sloan School of Management and co-author of PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, the
most widely-used U.S. graduate school textbook on corporate finance. A February 24,
1997, paper by Professor Charles W. Upton of Kent State University and submitted to
EPA as part of a public comment period on the Agency's policy of economic benefit,
also supports use of the risk-free rate for compounding past savings due to delayed and
avoided costs forward to the date of penalty payment. See CHARLES W. UPTON,
COMMENTS ON CALCULATION OF THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF NONCOMPLIANCE IN THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S CIVIL PENALTY ENFORCEMENT CASES (Feb.
24, 1997) (on file with author). See also Robert H. Fuhrman, The Role of EPA 's BEN
Model in Establishing Civil Penalties, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,246 (May
1991).
134 Had Mr. Fuhrman relied on the discount/interest forward rate methodology advocated
by Mr. Harris, Mr. Fuhrman would have calculated that the present value of the indirect
discharge alternative involving HRSD to be $13 million more expensive than the cost of
complying as a direct discharger to the Pagan River.
135 Nothing in the December 1993 version of the BEN USER'S MANUAL indicates that the
same compliance scenario must be used in both the "on time" and "delay" cases. In fact,
the manual contemplates several "special cases" in which proper analysis of economic
benefit requires comparison of different scenarios for on-time and for delayed
compliance. See BEN USER'S MANUAL, supra note 130, app. B. Economic expert
witnesses employed by the U.S. Department of Justice have sometimes issued expert
reports for use in litigation in which different means of compliance were assumed for on-
time and delay. For example, Gail B. Coad, of the economic consulting firm Industrial
Economics, Inc., used this approach in her November 17, 1991, expert report in United
States v. Mobil Oil Corp., CIVS-87-0627 LKK(JFM) (E.D. Cal.), which was prepared on
behalf of the plaintiff. Ms. Coad provided deposition testimony in that case on
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Smithfield will spend more money over time by sending its wastewater to
HRSD than it would have spent by installing its own direct discharge
facility on time and continuing to operate it into the foreseeable future. 
3 6
Despite testimony to the contrary, the trial court cut off the cash
flows in the economic benefit analysis as of the date of compliance.
Importantly, future life-cycle expenses like the HRSD user fees were
irrelevant to the court's reasoning.' According to the court:
Defendants do not get credit for past or future
money spent on HRSD user fees, sewer surcharges, or other
equipment installed at Gwaltney to enable them to connect
to HRSD, as the court finds based on the credible evidence
and testimony, that the user fees and surcharges are neither
avoided [sic] or delayed costs, and such equipment was not
necessary for a facility upgrade to bring defendants into
compliance.'38
In its interaction with Mr. Fuhrman during the trial, the court made
the same point this way:
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I believe a correct
economic analysis compares what it would have cost to
comply on time in a life cycle approach with what it
November 18-19, 1991. Jonathan S. Shefftz, of the same consulting firm, used this
approach in his May 15, 1997, expert report prepared on behalf of the U.S. Department
of Justice in United States v. Nucor Corp. See JONATHAN S. SHEFFTZ, EXPERT REPORT
ON ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND ECONOMIC IMPACT IN UNITED STATES V. NUCOR CORP., CV-
95-AR-2275-M (N.D. Ala.) (May 15, 1997).
136 Smithfield's decision to comply as an indirect discharger was the outcome of two
elements. First, Smithfield's engineers would not guarantee 100% compliance with the 2
mg/l standard as a direct discharger. With the spectre of intermittent violations and
subsequent enforcement, Smithfield chose the more reliable method of compliance.
Second, both federal and state effluent limitations had continued to become more strict
over the course of time. In order to avoid having the compliance goal posts constantly
one step ahead of Smithfield's facilities, Smithfield opted for what it believed to be the
alternative that was more reliable and less subject to change.
137 See United States v. Smithfield Foods Inc.. 972 F. Supp. 338, 348 n.16 (E.D. Va.
1997).
138 Id.
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actually does cost to comply. They have two different-
THE COURT: I'm not talking about an economic
analysis.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: I'm talking about a correct legal
approach to a case, Mr. Fuhrman.
We are not talking here about them being held
responsible for being in compliance. They have to be in
compliance. They don't get credit economically for being
in compliance. That keeps them from having further
penalties on them, and they are not being charged with
future penalties. They have to come into compliance.
What is being looked at is what is the penalty until
they came into compliance. Once they are in compliance, it
is over with, from a standpoint of legal penalties.
THE WITNESS: Your Honor-
THE COURT: And this isn't a settlement case.
This is not an environmental settlement case. The thing is,
they didn't settle. I understand that if you are settling a
case, you say, all right, assume you come into compliance,
what kind of credit in the future are we going to give you.
But this is not about settlement. It is about not
settling a case, not being in compliance up to a certain date.
Once you are in compliance, it is over with.'39
Not only did the court reject consideration of any post-compliance
costs, including over $500,000 in HRSD user charges by the date of the
trial, it also refused to consider any past costs Smithfield had incurred to
comply through HRSD (e.g., $238,233 spent to construct a pumping
station). 4 Given that this case is about Smithfield becoming an indirect
discharger, it is troublesome from a legal and policy perspective that the
trial court's economic benefit analysis compared: (1) what it presumably
would have cost Smithfield to construct a direct discharge facility in 1993
and operate it until the time of the actual hookups to HRSD; and (2) those
costs that Smithfield actually spent that would have been incurred in
139 See Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 642-43.
140 See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 348 n.16.
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conjunction with a direct discharge facility in the 1996-97 timeframe. 4'
Fatal to this premise is the fact that Smithfield did not construct a
direct discharge facility in 1997, but instead constructed an indirect
discharge facility. In short, the plaintiffs economic expert made a
comparison between two hypothetical worlds (both of which were based
on Smithfield complying as a direct discharger), and not a comparison
between a hypothetical and the actual world.
1 42
The distinction is critical. In most Clean Water Act cases, the
economic benefit of delayed compliance is determined by comparing what
it would have cost to install and operate pollution control equipment on
time to what it cost to install and operate the same equipment later in time.
In this typical calculation, operating and maintenance (O&M) costs
incurred after compliance may be safely ignored. They are identical and
cancel each other out.
But in the Smithfield case, future O&M figures associated with on-
time and delayed compliance did not cancel out because Smithfield's
actual compliance method, as an indirect discharger, was $2.25 million
more expensive per year than the direct discharge alternative. 43
The court should have taken this information into account in
calculating the economic benefit that Smithfield obtained by failing to
comply as a direct discharger in 1993 but complying instead several years
later as an indirect discharger. To do otherwise omits costs that were
mandated by the method of compliance upon which Smithfield relied to
achieve compliance. Other than the decision in Smithfield, there is no
other adjudicated case in which the cash flows in an economic benefit
analysis were truncated to exclude such actual pre-compliance pollution
control costs and/or post-compliance O&M costs when elimination of such
costs from the analysis would alter the calculated net economic benefit.
141 See Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 411-12.
142 The poor logic of this comparison may be illustrated as follows. Given that
Smithfield saved a certain sum of money by failing to comply as a direct discharger but
chose instead to comply as an indirect discharger, it is clear that Smithfield did not
"save" (meaning Smithfield was able to invest in profit-making activities) the total
amount of money that it would have had to spend to comply on-time as a direct
discharger. Nonetheless, that is the approach taken by Mr. Harris and adopted by the
court.
143 See FUHRMAN, supra note 59, tbls. 2, 3.
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In its decision, the Smithfield court paraphrased the court in Public
Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.'4 as
follows: "Since it is difficult to prove the precise economic benefit to a
polluter, a reasonable approximation of economic benefit is sufficient."'45
Exactly what constitutes a reasonable approximation is open to
interpretation, but presumably at minimum it is an analysis grounded in
the sound application of economic principles.
C. Discount/Interest Forward Rate
As indicated above, an economic benefit analysis compares the
value of two sets of cash flows, one associated with "on-time" compliance
and one associated with delayed compliance.'46 To place the value of
these two cost streams on a comparable basis as of a particular point in
time, discount and interest rates must be employed.'47
In his expert report and trial testimony, Dr. Kolbe opined that the
risk-free rate should be used in calculating the economic benefit resulting
from noncompliance with environmental requirements. According to Dr.
Kolbe, "[o]ne of the most fundamental lessons of modem finance theory is
that the appropriate rate of return at which to discount future cash flows or
to accrue interest on past cash flows is the 'cost of capital' for the cash
flows at issue"'48 as contrasted with the average cash flows available to
investors from other projects. This precept has profound implications for
144 913 F.2d 64, 80 (3d. Cir. 1990).
145 Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 348.
146 See supra notes 104 through 105 and accompanying text.
147 "Discounting" is a technique used in financial analysis to adjust a stream of monetary
payments or costs for the time value of money and risk associated with the relevant cash
flows. The concept underlying this adjustment is that a dollar received today is worth
more than a dollar received one year from now, and the further the payment is in the
future, the less it is worth today. For example, using a 10% discount rate, a dollar
received one year from now is only worth 91 cents today. One dollar received two years
from now is worth 83 cents today. Discount factors my be found in a "discount table"
published in any introductory finance textbook. Assuming that all "discounted" future
costs are expressed as a present value at a given point in time, past costs may be adjusted
to the same point in time by compounding each of them at an appropriate interest
forward rate.
148 A. LAWRENCE KOLBE, EXPERT REPORT OF A. LAWRENCE KOLBE ON DISCOUNT AND
INTEREST RATE ISSUES IN CALCULATING THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT FROM NON-
COMPLIANCE 1 (June 18, 1997) (on file with author).
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the method that should be used in economic benefit cases. Among other
things, it led Dr. Kolbe to conclude that, in -these cases, past cash flows
should be brought forward to present values by compounding at the risk-
free rate associated with short-term U.S. Treasury bills, with adjustments
for taxation, and future cash flows should be discounted to present value
by use of rates that reflect the time value of money and the risk of the cash
flows at issue.1 4
9
The economic benefit analysis of the plaintiffs expert witness
assumed that all savings from noncompliance should be adjusted to
present value by use of a single adjustment factor, which is based on the
corporation's weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 50 This is also the
approach specified in EPA's BEN User's Manual, 5' which has never been
subjected to a public rulemaking procedure. 52
The differences in economic benefit calculations resulting from the
use of a risk-free rate versus the WACC can be significant.'53 Depending
on the length of period of noncompliance and other input assumptions in a
given case, these methodological differences can produce results that
differ by orders of magnitude. Therefore, a court's selection of a
particular discount rate/interest forward methodology can have a profound
impact on the economic benefit of noncompliance.
In prior economic benefit cases, different judges have selected
different financial methodologies upon which to base economic benefit
determinations. For example, in United States v. Roll Coater,5 4 the court
selected the use of the WACC rate as the discount/interest forward rate
149 See id. at 2-4. See also Kenneth T. Wise et al., EPA's 'BEN' Model: Challenging
Excessive Penalty Calculations, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1492, 1495-6 (May 6, 1992).
ISO See HARRIS REPORT, supra note 105, at 3.
151 See BEN USER'S MANUAL, supra note 130, at 4-30.
152 See Robert H. Fuhrman, A Discussion of Technical Problems with EPA 's BEN Model,
1 ENVTL. LAw. 561, 589 (Feb. 1995).
153 For illustrative purposes, Mr. Fuhrman performed a calculation very similar to the one
performed by Mr. Harris in that it excluded all expenses that were solely related to
compliance as an indirect discharger. In that calculation, Mr. Fuhrman used corrected
cost figures and the financial methodology Dr. Kolbe opined to be correct. Under those
assumptions, he calculated an economic benefit figure of $630,370, substantially less
than the $4.2 million figure calculated by Mr. Harris and accepted as the economic
benefit of noncompliance by the court. See Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 648.
154 No. IP-898C, slip op. at 10. (S.D., Ind., March 22, 1991).
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and rejected use of the significantly-higher rate recommended by the
plaintiffs economic expert in that case, which was based on the cost of
equity capital.' In In re Harmon Electronics, Inc.,15 6 an EPA
administrative law judge accepted an economic benefit calculation that
was explicitly based on the use of U.S. Treasury bill (i.e., risk-free) rates
for the interest forward calculation.'57
After having considered the expert reports and testimony of both
EPA and Smithfield's witnesses, the court stated in its August 6, 1997,
opinion:
The court was more persuaded by the testimony of
the United States' economic benefit expert, Robert Harris.
The court rejects in most part the testimony of defendants'
experts Robert H. Fuhrman and A. Lawrence Kolbe, and
particularly the risk-free rate analysis. 5 '
Although the court acknowledged that "there are various methods
for calculating defendants' economic benefit gained from
noncompliance,"'59 its decision justified use of the WACC as both the
discount and interest forward rate in the economic benefit analysis by
declaring this approach "both the best and the appropriate method to
determine how much money defendants made on the funds they did not
spend for compliance."' 161 Significantly, the court did not state why it
disagreed with use of the risk-free rate, which would have required it to
explain why it disagreed with Dr. Kolbe's testimony: the court simply
rejected it.'6'
The court's lack of specificity is important. As posited by amici
American Automobile Manufacturers Association, et al. in their brief to
' Id. at 11.
156 No. RCRA-VII-91-H-0037,1994 RCRA Lexis 31 (EPA -Dec. 12, 1994), aff'd, No.
VII-91-H-0037, 1997 RCRA Lexis 2 (Envt'l App. Bd. Mar. 24, 1997), rev'd on other
grounds, Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Carol M. Browner, No. 97-0823-CV-W-3, 1998 WL
574421 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 1998).
157 No. RCRA-VII- 91-H-0037, Slip. op at p. 62. 1994 RCRA Lexis 31 (EPA Dec. 12,
1994), at p.24.
158 United States v. Smithfield Foods Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 349 n.17 (E.D. Va. 1997).
159 Id. at 349.
160 Id.
161 Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. 348 n.17.
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the Fourth Circuit in Smithfield:
When faced with competing expert opinions, a trial
court must "examine the differences between the
procedures used" because it is not sufficient "merely [to]
determine that one expert was more credible." U.S. v. Roll
Coater, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8790 at *12. A trial
court must state its reasons for rejecting a party's evidence
as unpersuasive, and a decision that fails to do so is
insupportable. Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561
F.2d 494, 519 (4th Cir. 1997). That principle applies with
full force to credibility determinations; the trial court must
enumerate the criteria it uses to determine whom it
believed. See Kilburn v. United States, 938 F.2d 666, 673
(6th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] 52(a) requires a district court to identify the
reasons underlying its choice between the alternatives
presented in the record, and failure to provide that
explanation requires a remand. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allied
Towing Corp., 966 F.2d 820, 827 (4th Cir. 1992).162
The trial court's lack of specificity leaves the rationale for its decision
unknown.
D. Admitted Errors
In his trial testimony, the United States' expert Mr. Harris admitted
that he may have made certain technical assumptions in his economic
benefit calculations (i.e., the tax rate and the use of the same "beta' ' 163 for
each relevant year) that he agreed were probably erroneous. 164 However,
162 Amicus curiae brief of Automobile Manufacturers Association at 26-27, Smithfield
Foods, Inc. v. United States, No. 97-2709 (4th Cir. Feb. 27, 1998).
163 "Beta" is a measure of the correlation between historical changes in the price of a
common stock and price movements in the stock market. Beta is an important variable in
calculating the cost of equity capital according to the "Capital Asset Pricing Model." See
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 119. ch. 9.
164 See Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 398-400.
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he stated that the net effect of remedying these incorrect assumptions
would only lead to approximately a four percent reduction in economic
benefit.'65 The court acknowledged this matter in its opinion, but did not
reduce the economic benefit to reflect this overage.'
Additionally, the court did not reach any conclusions about the
following unrebutted matters that Dr. Kolbe cited as errors in calculating
the WACC rate that Mr. Harris used: use of the coupon rate rather than
the market rate for determining the cost of debt; use of book value rather
than market value in determining the debt weight in the cost of capital
calculation; improper use of the 30-year bond as the benchmark for the
cost of equity calculation; and improper estimation of separate WACCs
for Gwaltney and Smithfield Packing.'67 Dr. Kolbe further testified that
Mr. Harris erred in applying his miscalculated WACC rate by
compounding on a daily basis.'68 Because components of Mr. Harris'
WACC calculation are annual benchmarks, according to Dr. Kolbe, daily
compounding constitutes double compounding.'69 Dr. Kolbe testified that
if Mr. Harris had calculated his WACC rate correctly, he would have used
a rate of 10.5 percent, rather than the effective rate of 13.3 percent he used
through improper compounding. 7o
Although the above list of issues may appear quite technical to a
lay audience, assuming Dr. Kolbe is correct about these alleged errors, the
economic benefit in this case was significantly miscalculated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether Smithfield should have been subject to penalties for its
phosphorus discharges before it connected to HRSD is a contentious
question that continues to be litigated in the Fourth Circuit. Legal issues
aside, there remain three major economic issues regarding the $12.6
million penalty assessed against Smithfield. First, Smithfield will spend
considerably more money due to its connection to HRSD than it would
165 See id. at 399.
166 See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 349 n.19.
167 See Trial Tr., supra note 29, at 601-606.
168 See id. at 597, 606.
169 See id. at 606.
170 See id. at 597, 626.
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have spent as a direct discharger.'7 ' This indisputable economic fact
rationally should lead to the conclusion that Smithfield has not, and will
not, gain any economic benefit from having continued to discharge into
the Pagan River while it waited for its connection to HRSD to become
available. Logic supports that conclusion, as do traditional economic
principles that have been used in other adjudicated environmental civil
penalty cases.
Second, in the absence of a well-articulated discussion of the
alternative economic methods advocated by each side's expert witnesses,
the Smithfield court has not firmly established that the approach it selected
as "both the best and most appropriate method"' 72 actually provides a
"reasonable approximation of economic benefit."'73 Given the magnitude
of the penalty and the wide disparity between the results produced by the
different methodologies, the absence of such a discussion is particularly
unfortunate.
Finally, the calculation errors essentially acknowledged by Mr.
Harris should have lowered the ultimate penalty assessed against
Smithfield. It is puzzling how the court could dismiss $160,000 as an
insignificant amount. 74
The legal and economic issues in the Smithfield litigation are
complicated and do not easily yield to simplification. These complexities,
however, should not obscure the fact that Smithfield did not economically
benefit from its decision to comply with the Commonwealth's orders.
Absent the federal overfiling issue, the Smithfield case is reduced to a
routine set of enforcement issues. If the case stands for anything, it is that
Smithfield was caught in a struggle between EPA and the Commonwealth
of Virginia regarding Smithfield's understanding with Virginia of which
EPA was aware for five years prior to the filing of the complaint. Because
of the irregularities in EPA's enforcement action and the decision of the
Court not to consider all relevant costs in its economic benefit analysis, the
171 If, as the court articulated, "[c]ourts use economic benefit analysis to level the
economic playing field and prevent violators from gaining an unfair competitive
advantage," it is hard to understand how disregarding Smithfield's actual costs due to its
connection to HRSD achieves that goal. Smitfl!ield, 972 F. Supp. at 348.
172 Id. at 349.
173 Id. at 348.
174 See id. at 348 n.19.
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trial court's decision in Smithfield may not be the final judgment in this
case.
